@lepanto dijo en US Navy:
Un informe del GAO publicado el 17 de julio
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-107974.pdf
What GAO Found
The Navy is currently 24 months behind in its efforts to modernize three DDG 1000 Zumwalt class destroyers to host the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic missile as part of its surface strike mission. Both the DDG 1000 and CPS efforts face challenges:
· Although modernization of the first ship in the class, USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), was 94 percent complete as of January 2026, it is behind schedule due to unplanned work.
· The DDG 1000 class ships have unique systems, such as its radar, combat, and network systems, that are costly and difficult to sustain and maintain.
· The CPS effort was originally scheduled to begin flight testing on the DDG 1000 class in 2025 but this is now planned for 2027 due to funding and testing challenges.
· The CPS program encountered quality and production issues putting the current rate well below the production goal of 12 missile rounds per year.
[image: image003.jpg]
Figure 2: Types of Work in DDG 1000 Class Build Yard Modernization Period
[image: image006.jpg]
Figure 5: Planned Schedule for the DDG 1000 Class Build Yard Modification Period, as of June 2026
Unplanned work. Program officials reported that the primary cause of recent delays is unplanned work. Program officials noted that the Navy modified the BYMP contract with Huntington Ingalls in August 2025 to add 230,000 hours—at a cost of $20 million—for unplanned work. Among other things, the unplanned work addresses the need for more cabling than was anticipated in the initial project design, as the contractor cut and removed more cabling than planned from the forward part of the ship for CPS missile launch tube installation. The additional cabling was needed to match changes to the ship configuration since new construction cables were installed as part of the BYMP. Another source of unplanned work and delays per program officials is that this is the first time that the Navy has shut down and restarted key DDG 1000 class ship systems. For example, equipment failures in the ship’s complex electrical system, which is akin to a small power plant, contributed to delays. Program officials said that, as this is the first time the Navy is installing and integrating a hypersonic weapon system on a ship, the Navy is working to mitigate risk by actively documenting and applying lessons learned to the BYMP schedule and work processes for the remaining ships.
...
Conclusions
Fielding capabilities like hypersonic missiles is critical for deterring and, if necessary, defeating peer adversaries. These missiles, however, are expected to cost nearly $70 million per missile and over $40 billion for 224 missiles. This includes the cost to develop and incorporate the necessary technologies on only some of a growing number of large and complex Navy platforms. Some of these platforms, such as the DDG 1000 class, have their own sustainability and affordability issues. Moreover, the Navy cannot make decisions in isolation since the Army is buying its own missiles and manages key aspects of production. Despite these complexities, the Navy and the Army do not have a comprehensive strategy to guide CPS portfolio investments in a way that facilitates effective and efficient allocation of funding to achieve the capability envisioned in the services’ respective plans. Without such a strategy, the Navy and the Army create the potential for both additional delay and inefficient use of taxpayer funds.
