Moderadores: Lepanto, poliorcetes, Edu, Orel
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Fort Worth, Texas, has been awarded a $9,326,062 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the Long Range Systems Division seeking to integrate the Navy Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-Extended Range (AARGM-ER) into the F-35. The AARGM-ER is a Navy weapon that will provide the F-35A advanced suppression of enemy air defenses/destruction of enemy air defenses capability. This contract includes one contract line item number and is the result of a sole-source acquisition. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the full amount are being obligated at the time of award. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, is the contracting activity (FA8682-21-C-2000).
Vorlon escribió:¿216 horas? ¿Cuantos llegan en EuropaOTAN a las 180 que recomienda la OTAN?
Saludos
Orel escribió:
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- Excepto la relevante furtividad, por lo cual son cuartas, el Rafale y el EFA pertenecen al resto de ese marco (conciencia situacional, información y rendimiento de la plataforma, con un poco de furtividad), así fueron concebidos de nacimiento.
- El F-22 es quinta y no pertenece a la parte de sensores/detectar/conciencia al nivel que los F-35 y EFA/Rafale (multisensorialidad, detectar en mayor espectro de longitudes de onda). Sin IRST, FLIR, DAS ni visor de casco, está un escalón por debajo.
Discrepo, precisamente la fusión de sensores y suite electrónica es uno de los puntos débiles del Typhoon (me vuelvo a remitir al informe Suizo). El Raptor que es de su época está muy por delante en sensores.
That verdict did not change, even when the improvements to be expected by 2015 were factored in. The development of the Eurofighter’s air-ground capability has lagged significantly behind that of the Rafale. Even so, the proposed Tranche 3 P1E enhancements to the four-nation jet, that were evaluated by the Swiss team, failed to match the F3+ standard improvements to the Rafale numbering 18, and already contracted by the French air force. They included AESA radar and other sensor improvements.
...
The report praised the aerodynamic performance of the Eurofighter, notably its ability to supercruise at Mach 1.4. But the sensor data fusion and the EW suite were “weak points,” while range and systems reliability were noted to be “limiting factors.” Moreover, the report said, “the capabilities of the Eurofighter to fulfill recce and strike missions were rated as unsatisfactory.”
En teoría no podian presentar un aparato que no estuviese operativas en 2019Pathfinder escribió:¿Qué ha pasado con el Grippen para este renovado concurso Suizo, porque no se han presentado esta vez?
Milites escribió:En teoría no podian presentar un aparato que no estuviese operativas en 2019Pathfinder escribió:¿Qué ha pasado con el Grippen para este renovado concurso Suizo, porque no se han presentado esta vez?
Enviado desde mi SM-J610FN mediante Tapatalk
Atticus escribió:Milites escribió:En teoría no podian presentar un aparato que no estuviese operativas en 2019Pathfinder escribió:¿Qué ha pasado con el Grippen para este renovado concurso Suizo, porque no se han presentado esta vez?
Enviado desde mi SM-J610FN mediante Tapatalk
Justo eso. El NG no podria estar "terminado" y el "viejo" no tenia posibilidades. Y esa condicion vino precisamente porque el famoso "informe suizo" al que tanto se hace referencia era un autentico desproposito que estaba lleno de cosas puestas porque si. Las fechas de "disponibilidades" que tantas tardes de discusion nos han dado terminaron siendo totalmente arbitrarias y no estaban basadas mas que en opiniones personales no muy bien sustentadas. Asi que para esta vez dedicieron tirar por la calle de enmedio: avion funcionando y tal como este funcionando, por mas que tambien se aceptaran planes sobre esos mismos aviones... por presiones de alguien que jamas imaginariais.
A mi entender el Gripen es el avion que necesitan. Y si me apuras, con sus pocas ganas de tomarse en serio la defensa aerea, incluso el C les daba de sobras. Ojo, a Austria igual. Austria debio haber elegido al Gripen en su dia en vez de al Tifon.
“Our primary mission is SEAD, but we have also flown secondary missions sets like escort, OCA, DCA and interdiction. We have taken advantage of the fact that we have a variety of platforms like the Raptor, Vipers and Hornets here, and we have flown some DACT missions, as well as learning the capabilities of those platforms and how we can employ the F-35’s capabilities with them. It has been a great experience these last two weeks, because we have been able to exercise and train for a lot of different mission sets. The majority of the missions we are doing here have incorporated some sort of SEAD and that is the primary role for our F-35s. The F-35 cannot carry the HARM AGM-88 right now – though there might be a future variant developed for the F-35 to carry in its internal weapons bay.”...
...Elaborating on the differences between flying the F-35A and the F-16, he [LtCol Peel] said: “The overall situational awareness (SA) that you get with the F-35, by linking all the advanced sensors on the airplanes together, provides you with a truly 360 degree SA – whereas in the F-16 you have limited visibility in front of you.
“Obviously the data-links have increased the capability of the 4th generation aircraft, but the overall SA that you get in the F-35 is second to none – it is a force-multiplier in an AoR (Area of Responsibility), simply because you can now provide the same SA to all the other airframes you are working with. It is truly a leap forward in technology.”
Dogfight tactics
“Also, preparing for a close-in dogfight in the F-35 is easier compared to an F-16, because on an F-16 you’ll have drop tanks that you need to get rid of. The F-35 carries more internal fuel than an F-16, and will not carry drop tanks closer to the AoR, as we refuel before heading into the mission.
“The user interface on the F-35 is so much easier than an F-16, too. The whole point of the F-35 is to not get into a visual engagement and, instead, use its stealth characteristics to approach undetected and shoot down the enemy aircraft. “The F-35 and all the technology that has gone into it, definitely makes it much more lethal and survivable than most fighters these days.
“We are definitely not the fastest airplane in the sky, but the F-35 is pretty capable and brings a whole other dimension to support the mission set we’ll find ourselves in, in the future.” Peel finishes by explaining his personal takeaway from this exercise: “We have done pretty well here, as we are very much at the beginning of our conversion window. We’re a bunch of F-16 pilots that have a couple of thousand hours in the F-16 – but, on average, just 100 hours in the F-35 – so we’ve still got a lot to learn on how to tactically employ the F-35. “We’ve seen a lot of things here, we have learned a lot of good lessons and we are definitely going to come out of here a better and stronger squadron than when we arrived. So that has lent itself to a win here.
”We will use the coming months during our conversion to learn how to employ the F-35 better tactically, gaining a lot more experience from every training opportunity to bring the fight to anybody in any AoR that we need to with this airplane.”"
Fourth against fifth
Commander Peel explained the nuances of flying with and against the F-22: “We were able to use our sensors to negate them as a threat. There are definitely some distinct advantages of the F-22 even against the F-16, which is considered a dogfighting machine. But it comes down to the pilot a lot of the times. If you can negate some initial shots and/or get an F-22 outside of their power and energy advantage, the F-35 does quite well.”
He continued: “I’ve seen F-35s going out and beating F-16s and F-22s and also losing to both of those platforms. A lot of that comes with the pilot – the machine obviously helps, but if the pilot doesn’t know how to fly that machine it doesn’t do much good. There are definitely some distinct advantages in the sensors and capabilities of the F-35 that the F-22 doesn’t have, so taking advantage of that in the BFM fights is crucial.
“The F-35 has low drag but it bleeds energy rather quickly. However, the engine is very powerful so you can get that energy back pretty fast. For BFM [basic fighter manoeuvres] in the F-16 you always wanted to stay fast, whereas the F-35 has some great slow speed manoeuvring that the F-16 didn’t have, such as being able to fly at a high AOA [angle of attack]. Again, it all depends on the pilot. You have to know the strengths and weaknesses, and capitalise on them.”
Lt Col David Delmage, an F-22 pilot and commander of the 27th FS, tells his side of flying with and against the F-35: “The F-35 is much more survivable than legacy aircraft. Their situational awareness is much higher due to their advanced systems and they are better protected based on their stealth. They are easier to protect from enemy air threats and they can get closer to the surface threats the same way we can.”
On the downside, Delmage said: “The F-35 is more limited on weapons. They are a smaller aircraft and carry less, and since everything has to be internal it further restricts the number of missiles especially if carrying air-to-ground ordnance as well. So, we have to be careful about weapons allocation and when/where to use them in the air-to-air role.
“As far as flying against them, it can be very tricky to try to run our normal tactics versus a stealth adversary. The F-35 integration is newer and we’ve had less experience with that type of fighting so it’s a bit more valuable at this point. It’s an emerging tactic that is going to be a factor for a long time into the future.”..."
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Blue against red
During the two-week exercise, 658 sorties were flown, consisting of a morning and afternoon wave each day. The scenarios varied but always featured ‘red air’ and ‘blue air’ components. Missions typically required the ‘blue’ team to eliminate targets in the ‘red’ airspace, which were heavily contested and defended not just by the ‘red’ aircraft but also by various ground-based enemy air defences.
The F-35 and F-22 units were usually working together flying ‘blue air’, with the F-22 trying to achieve air dominance and protect the strike assets. The main platform driving the scenarios was the Vermont F-35s, so the majority of missions were heavily SEAD-focused.
An F-35 pilot, Commander Peel said: “We’re trying to gain experience with the SEAD role as well as integrating with other 5th/4th-gen platforms and practising multi-role air-to-air dissimilar air combat training (DACT). We try to work in conjunction either with other assets or other F-35s in order to take out critical nodes of integrated air defence systems and/or tactical SAMs that are a threat to strikers or coalitions assets in the AOR (area of responsibility).
“The F-35 has a pretty capable EW suite built into the airplane itself. If you were a Block 50 F-16 squadron, they have an HTS (HARM targeting system) pod and that allows them to detect threats on the ground, and that’s all internal to the F-35. We’re able to detect and find SAM [surface-to-air missile] sites just with the F-35 itself and the EW system built into the airplane and we will use our bomb and missile load-out or our internal jamming to negate those threats. We’re also integrating with the F-22s on ‘blue air’ to perfect tactics and our fighter integration, so we understand everybody’s strengths and weaknesses and work together to negate threats.”
It is worth noting the F-16s from the 148th FW in Duluth as well as the F/A-18Es from VFA-151 also sometimes flew SEAD during the exercise, integrating their tactics and strategies with the F-35. One technique was to use the advanced EW capabilities of the F-35 to penetrate the air defence systems and provide targeting information to the older fourth generation aircraft which can then use their AGM-88 HARM missiles to eliminate the threats. The F-35 cannot carry HARM missiles. However, the F-35 (not surprisingly) held its own in the air-to-air game. The ‘red’ team with its T-38s and L-159s were always supplemented by other aircraft, such as F-16s and F/A-18s depending on the particular day’s manoeuvres.
One of the more interesting scenarios included the Langley F-22s acting as ‘red air’ and simulating a near-peer adversary using fifth generation stealth aircraft. Impressively during this particular scenario, the F-35s flying with the other ‘blue’ players didn’t take any losses, despite more than 30 adversaries.
Lessons learned
The 158th FW achieved another milestone in the course of the exercise, flying their 1,000th F-35 sortie since the conversion to the F-35 began last year. The challenges and learning opportunities still remain, however, as Lt Col Peel explained: “We’re hoping that a year from now to be fairly well versed in all of the different types of missions we’re expected to employ the airplane, in different theatres. We are still on the first third of that training window. Just gaining exposure and reps – this is the first time a lot of our pilots have been working into large force exercises in the F-35.
“The basic flying of the aircraft, we have at a high level coming out of training. It’s the employment of the airplane that you have to get exposure to, and this is our first step in the conversion process. There are things we have done with our tactics that haven’t been perfect. The airplanes are performing great and I’d say it’s more of our learning curve on our side. We’re trying to figure out how we’re going to work and employ with each other so there’s more things that the operators themselves have done that haven’t been efficient but nothing that can’t be fixed with proper tactics.”
It sounds like Northern Lightning was the ideal playground for the ‘Green Mountain Boys’ from Vermont as they approached the first anniversary of flying the F-35A.”
Pathfinder escribió:Pyro escribió:Sinceramente creo que da mucha importancia al coste hora de vuelo pero es dato, realmente puede variar mucho según como se opere y el concepto logístico, por ejemplo si no vuelas el coste se dispara ya que tienes un gasto mínimo que no te puedes quitar. Hay mas números que mirar en conjunto como es el porcentaje de operatividad y horas de vuelo por cada aeronave...
Totalmente de acuerdo, de hecho he estado dándole vueltas en la cabeza al desfase de los 44.000 dólares/ hora del link aportado por Bandua y los 36.000 dólares/hora que me salían a mí tomando los datos económicos aportados por el GAO del pentágono de 9 millones de dólares por avión al año, y no veo otra posibilidad que los F-35 A en el año 2018 estuvieron lejos de las 250 horas que la USAF estipulaba para ellos.
Saliendo unos 44.000 dólares/hora y 9 millones de dólares al año por avión salen unas 204 horas al año y no 250 horas. Y de aquí pasamos al problema gordo que es el sistema de gestión de recambios, mantenimiento y toda la pesca, el ALIS, ese programa que lo acaban de cambiar por el ODIN. Barrunto que el hecho de no cumplir las 250 horas es en gran parte debido al ALIS.
De hecho el general Winter de la oficina del programa decía que en cuanto tuvieran arreglado al ALIS, bajarían bastante el coste de la hora de vuelo del avión. Y de ahí viene el problema, todo más o menos cuadra.
bandua escribió:Pathfinder escribió:Pyro escribió:Sinceramente creo que da mucha importancia al coste hora de vuelo pero es dato, realmente puede variar mucho según como se opere y el concepto logístico, por ejemplo si no vuelas el coste se dispara ya que tienes un gasto mínimo que no te puedes quitar. Hay mas números que mirar en conjunto como es el porcentaje de operatividad y horas de vuelo por cada aeronave...
Totalmente de acuerdo, de hecho he estado dándole vueltas en la cabeza al desfase de los 44.000 dólares/ hora del link aportado por Bandua y los 36.000 dólares/hora que me salían a mí tomando los datos económicos aportados por el GAO del pentágono de 9 millones de dólares por avión al año, y no veo otra posibilidad que los F-35 A en el año 2018 estuvieron lejos de las 250 horas que la USAF estipulaba para ellos.
Saliendo unos 44.000 dólares/hora y 9 millones de dólares al año por avión salen unas 204 horas al año y no 250 horas. Y de aquí pasamos al problema gordo que es el sistema de gestión de recambios, mantenimiento y toda la pesca, el ALIS, ese programa que lo acaban de cambiar por el ODIN. Barrunto que el hecho de no cumplir las 250 horas es en gran parte debido al ALIS.
De hecho el general Winter de la oficina del programa decía que en cuanto tuvieran arreglado al ALIS, bajarían bastante el coste de la hora de vuelo del avión. Y de ahí viene el problema, todo más o menos cuadra.
Estuvieron lejos de los objetivos eso es casi seguro. Ahora mismo el problema lo tienen en varios aspectos, está n lejos de las previsiones de vuelo, están lejos de los costes de mantenimiento esperados (44000 con prevision de 36000-34000 hacia 2024 cuando LM anunciaba 26000) y siguen excediendo año a año el presupuesto previsto del programa. Luego sí, LM dice que cada año fabrica más barato el avión pero el coste del programa no para de superar lo presupuestado.
Por eso a estas alturas decir que va a ser más barato que cualquiera de los ya operativos es conjeturar y empieza a ser tan evidente que no va a ser así, que las métricas ya van cambiando y para que el F35 no salga tan mal parado se quiere meter en la cuenta de los 4as el coste de otros sistemas de apoyo que al parecer el F35 no va a necesitar o se hace la comparacion con el f16 metiendo para el 4a los costes de sistemas que comparte con la flota de F-15 etc... Comparacion y propuestas nada claras (por cuanto no se define bien de que apoyo se habla) y que aunque es razonable hacerlas, es evidente que se hacen por una única razón, en el día a día volar un F35 va a ser mucho más caro que cualquier 4a.
14yellow14 escribió:
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Fourth against fifth
Commander Peel explained the nuances of flying with and against the F-22: “We were able to use our sensors to negate them as a threat. There are definitely some distinct advantages of the F-22 even against the F-16, which is considered a dogfighting machine. But it comes down to the pilot a lot of the times. If you can negate some initial shots and/or get an F-22 outside of their power and energy advantage, the F-35 does quite well.”
He continued: “I’ve seen F-35s going out and beating F-16s and F-22s and also losing to both of those platforms. A lot of that comes with the pilot – the machine obviously helps, but if the pilot doesn’t know how to fly that machine it doesn’t do much good. There are definitely some distinct advantages in the sensors and capabilities of the F-35 that the F-22 doesn’t have, so taking advantage of that in the BFM fights is crucial.
“The F-35 has low drag but it bleeds energy rather quickly. However, the engine is very powerful so you can get that energy back pretty fast. For BFM [basic fighter manoeuvres] in the F-16 you always wanted to stay fast, whereas the F-35 has some great slow speed manoeuvring that the F-16 didn’t have, such as being able to fly at a high AOA [angle of attack]. Again, it all depends on the pilot. You have to know the strengths and weaknesses, and capitalise on them.”
Lt Col David Delmage, an F-22 pilot and commander of the 27th FS, tells his side of flying with and against the F-35: “The F-35 is much more survivable than legacy aircraft. Their situational awareness is much higher due to their advanced systems and they are better protected based on their stealth. They are easier to protect from enemy air threats and they can get closer to the surface threats the same way we can.”
On the downside, Delmage said: “The F-35 is more limited on weapons. They are a smaller aircraft and carry less, and since everything has to be internal it further restricts the number of missiles especially if carrying air-to-ground ordnance as well. So, we have to be careful about weapons allocation and when/where to use them in the air-to-air role.
“As far as flying against them, it can be very tricky to try to run our normal tactics versus a stealth adversary. The F-35 integration is newer and we’ve had less experience with that type of fighting so it’s a bit more valuable at this point. It’s an emerging tactic that is going to be a factor for a long time into the future.”..."
...
Blue against red
During the two-week exercise, 658 sorties were flown, consisting of a morning and afternoon wave each day. The scenarios varied but always featured ‘red air’ and ‘blue air’ components. Missions typically required the ‘blue’ team to eliminate targets in the ‘red’ airspace, which were heavily contested and defended not just by the ‘red’ aircraft but also by various ground-based enemy air defences.
The F-35 and F-22 units were usually working together flying ‘blue air’, with the F-22 trying to achieve air dominance and protect the strike assets. The main platform driving the scenarios was the Vermont F-35s, so the majority of missions were heavily SEAD-focused.
An F-35 pilot, Commander Peel said: “We’re trying to gain experience with the SEAD role as well as integrating with other 5th/4th-gen platforms and practising multi-role air-to-air dissimilar air combat training (DACT). We try to work in conjunction either with other assets or other F-35s in order to take out critical nodes of integrated air defence systems and/or tactical SAMs that are a threat to strikers or coalitions assets in the AOR (area of responsibility).
“The F-35 has a pretty capable EW suite built into the airplane itself. If you were a Block 50 F-16 squadron, they have an HTS (HARM targeting system) pod and that allows them to detect threats on the ground, and that’s all internal to the F-35. We’re able to detect and find SAM [surface-to-air missile] sites just with the F-35 itself and the EW system built into the airplane and we will use our bomb and missile load-out or our internal jamming to negate those threats. We’re also integrating with the F-22s on ‘blue air’ to perfect tactics and our fighter integration, so we understand everybody’s strengths and weaknesses and work together to negate threats.”
It is worth noting the F-16s from the 148th FW in Duluth as well as the F/A-18Es from VFA-151 also sometimes flew SEAD during the exercise, integrating their tactics and strategies with the F-35. One technique was to use the advanced EW capabilities of the F-35 to penetrate the air defence systems and provide targeting information to the older fourth generation aircraft which can then use their AGM-88 HARM missiles to eliminate the threats. The F-35 cannot carry HARM missiles. However, the F-35 (not surprisingly) held its own in the air-to-air game. The ‘red’ team with its T-38s and L-159s were always supplemented by other aircraft, such as F-16s and F/A-18s depending on the particular day’s manoeuvres.
One of the more interesting scenarios included the Langley F-22s acting as ‘red air’ and simulating a near-peer adversary using fifth generation stealth aircraft. Impressively during this particular scenario, the F-35s flying with the other ‘blue’ players didn’t take any losses, despite more than 30 adversaries.
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