www.portierramaryaire.com

Informe de RAND sobre las capacidades y los presupuestos de defensa de las FFAA rusas: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/p ... RR2573.pdf

This study has found the following:

• A surge in funding starting in 2000 has enabled the development of Russian military forces that are more capable under more varied circumstances than was the case in the first two decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

• The modernization of Russia’s weapons and equipment and changes in force structure have emphasized improvements in strategic and operational air defenses focused on key defensive bastions; faster generation of ground units at high readiness; and improved long-range munitions, especially short-range ballistic missiles and land-attack cruise missiles.

• Increasing numbers of contract soldiers, a more professional NCO corps, improved training, more exercises and, increasingly, combat operations in Ukraine and Syria, have resulted in broad improvements to the quality of Russian units.

Although most Russian forces are postured defensively, the capabilities Russia has pursued gives them substantial offensive capability against states along Russia’s borders. Russia’s forces also now have some limited ability to project power farther abroad, as in Syria.

Russian capabilities have improved to the point that a hypothetical Russia strike against the Baltic states or other U.S. NATO allies would pose a serious challenge to NATO. Many of the capabilities developed by the United States and its NATO allies for high-intensity conflict in Europe have been dismantled as U.S. armed forces have shifted to combat insurgencies in Afghanistan, Africa, and the Middle East and to address new challenges posed by China. The Russian military has changed, but still draws heavily on its heritage from the Soviet military.
Some of NATO’s former capabilities would be missed in a conflict with a modernized Russian force equipped with substantial indirect fires systems, air defenses, and the ability to conduct battalionand brigade-scale combined-arms operations.

On the other hand, Russia’s military is much smaller and, in many respects, less capable of large-scale offensive operations than was the Soviet Army. Russia’s present ability to generate battalion-sized tactical groups for combat in eastern Ukraine is not the same as the ability to conduct coordinated operations with division- and army-sized units.

Although Russian capabilities have been on display in Syria, its operations in that country are not a sufficient basis to argue that Russia has the consistent capacity to project larger-scale power far from Russia’s borders. Moreover, whatever its performance in Syria, there is reason to believe that Russian capabilities are not evenly spread across Russia’s entire armed forces.

Russia’s military remains in transition. Some components, including air defenses and certain strike capabilities, are on track to complete modernization by the end of this decade. Other components, like the general-purpose Ground Forces and Air Force units, are improving more gradually; a complete transformation seems unlikely even by the end of the next decade. Still other components, such as a Russian Navy capable of serious power projection or blue water capability, are distant and unlikely to be realized.

The Russian armed forces are not yet where they wish to be, but they have improved, and gradual improvements will continue albeit at a slower pace in light of falling Russian defense budgets. Declines in projected defense budgets through 2020 and the more modest SAP through 2027 suggest that the Russian government appears to be satisfied with the progress in military modernization to date.

Although expenditures will still exceed those between 2000 and 2010, budgets will be much tighter than between 2010 and 2015, particularly if the Russian leadership acts on its promises to shift more resources into social programs and infrastructure investment. Russian slow growth will exacerbate the gap in aggregate and per capita output with its European neighbors. Russia’s economy remains just 11.6 percent of the European Union’s and 10.4 percent of the United States’, or 5.5 percent of the economies of the two entities combined. Economically, Russia is a European power, not a global one. Militarily, Russia is once again a strong European military power; outside of its nuclear force, it is not a global military competitor with the United States as a whole.

Despite Russia’s limitations economically and militarily, NATO policymakers and defense planners will need to continue to track and seriously consider improvements to its military. Russian capabilities to invade or threaten its immediate neighbors, especially those countries not part of NATO, have increased and are not going away. And Russia’s actions in Syria indicate that although its military grasp may be limited, it is willing to reach a bit farther if it thinks there are gains to be had.

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En vísperas de las vacaciones profesionales de Dalnik, el comandante de aviación de largo alcance, Héroe de Rusia, honró al piloto militar Teniente General Sergei KOBYLASH respondió preguntas de MK.
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- Dicen que el Tu-160M ??modernizado, además de los nuevos misiles de crucero X-101 y X-102, también recibirá “Dagas” hipersónicas. ¿Y debido a un sistema informático especial instalado a bordo, incluso las bombas no guiadas se utilizarán como armas de precisión?

- Nuestros aviones y sus armas se mejoran constantemente. El desarrollo adicional de la aviación de largo alcance se lleva a cabo no solo modernizando los bombarderos Tu-160, Tu-95MS, Tu-22MZ con una extensión de su vida útil, sino también creando un prometedor complejo de aviación de largo alcance: el bombardero estratégico de quinta generación. El nuevo avión será subsónico. Podrá resolver todas las tareas de la aviación de largo alcance. Se espera que para 2040 se cree un bombardero estratégico de sexta generación, que ya estará sin tripulación.
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