¿Creéis posible alcanzar algo parecido a una doctrina estable, primar de una vez la movilidad o la protección?
Empiezo con un artículo muy sugerente (espero)
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4658359
Mobility Vs. Survivability
JLTV Could Suffer as U.S. Army, Marines Diverge
By KATE BRANNEN
Published: 7 June 2010 PRINT | EMAIL
After years of fighting side-by-side in MRAP armored vehicles, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps are striking out in different directions.
The Army is making vehicle and crew survivability its main priority in its Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program, while the Marine Corps is determined to reclaim its role as an expeditionary force that relies on lighter vehicles that can quickly be transported around the world.
The diverging paths return the two services to their definitional roles, but they also represent fundamentally different perspectives on how forces should fight - and could undercut the services' joint effort to build a replacement for tens of thousands of Humvee utility vehicles.
"We need to get lighter," Lt. Gen. George Flynn, commander of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, told reporters June 3 at the Pentagon. "And sometimes, when you look at your vehicle strategy, you have to take a look at the environment that you're going to operate in. There's a protection that comes from mobility. If you can move fast and if you can move on unpredictable routes, you can not necessarily armor up as much."
The Army, on the other hand, has set very aggressive protection requirements for its GCV, which is now expected to be tracked and weigh 50 to 70 tons.
There's really no way around 50-plus tons when a vehicle has to carry 12 soldiers, have a gun turret, and accept upgradable armor as IEDs get better, said one source familiar with the program.
Critics point out that at 70 tons, the GCV would be the heaviest infantry fighting vehicle in existence - as heavy as the Abrams tank.
But Army leaders note that the top weight includes scalable armor that would be used only when needed.
"This whole idea about deployability is much, much easier to talk about on this side of the next war, but on the other side of the next war, when people are shooting at you, survivability really, really means something," Gen. Peter Chiarelli, vice chief of the Army, told an audience at the Army's armor conference last month in Ft. Knox, Ky.
Again, a difference in approach: Brig. Gen. Michael Brogan, commander of the Marine Corps Systems Command, told lawmakers in March that vehicle and body armor is not the only way to lower troops' risk.
"Our protection philosophy must also include training our leaders in personal protective measures that provide flexibility and protection scalability," Brogan said March 17 before the House Armed Services seapower and expeditionary forces subcommittee.
"Where speed, tactical maneuverability, environmental and terrain consideration dictate the most important capabilities needed in our vehicles, we will carefully consider the tradeoffs in conventional heavy armor protection versus the operational requirements for performance," Brogan said. "These tradeoffs are not taken lightly and they are done with full consideration that our Marines will be taking the vehicles into harm's way."
JLTV DEBATE
Together, the services are working through the tradeoffs between survivability and transportability in the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program, where the Marine Corps has raised concerns about vehicle weight.
"Although weight is a huge operational and tactical concern for both the Army and Marines, it is really more of a problem for the Marine Corps at the strategic level because of their 'get there the fastest with the mostest' expeditionary mandate," an industry source said.
Key among the Corps' concerns is "weighing out" a ship before it is "cubed out:" creating a load that makes the ship too heavy to maneuver long before its cargo spaces are filled.
"It's hard to tell the Navy how to design an amphibious ship if we don't know what the weight is of all the equipment that we're going to put on it," Flynn said.
While the Marine Corps remains committed to the JLTV program, it is also pursuing lower-cost and lighter-weight upgrades to its Humvee fleet that may eventually compete with JLTV funding. Chief among these is the Small Combat Tactical Vehicle Capsule (SCTVC) developed by Textron Marine and Land Systems and Granite Tactical Vehicles. The bolt-on capsule fits onto the chassis of existing Humvees. With the capsule, the vehicle weighs less than an up-armored Humvee, yet is much better protected.
Textron and Granite Tactical Vehicles also intend to enter the SCTVC in a competition to win an Army contract to upgrade Humvees, according to Mark Savarese, vice president of business development for Textron Marine & Land Systems.
The companies have delivered six vehicles to the Marine Corps for testing.
The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab at Quantico, Va., completed blast and ballistic testing on the vehicle, and this August, they will do hot-weather testing, according to Marine Corps spokesman Lt. Col. Roger Galbraith. After that testing is complete, the Marine Corps will make a decision whether or not to move forward with the program, he said.
If the Corps decides to go down this road instead of sticking with the JLTV program, it can use the money saved to help pay for the "much-maligned" Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, "which they really, really want," the industry source said.
MRAPS' FATE
The services also have to decide how to use their MRAPs. While the Army first thought it would put most of them into equipment sets that units could choose to leave home, the service is now considering putting more of them directly into units.
At the armor conference, Chiarelli said it's well-known that other services don't want MRAPs because they don't fit on ships.
"But as soon as we go anywhere where you need that level of protection, the first thing you hear is 'Where are the MRAPs?'" he said.
Flynn said the Marine Corps is considering the issue in its still-under-construction ground tactical vehicles strategy.
"We're looking at what is the right mix for the Marine Corps," he said. "For example, not every battalion is going to have a full complement of MRAPs."
But if Marines are headed into an environment with IEDs, they could go to the vehicle pool and get the right vehicles for the mission, he said.
Flynn said the service is evaluating three categories of vehicles: heavy, medium and light. Heavy includes tanks and amphibious assault vehicles, Light Armored Vehicles fall into the medium category and light are the up-armored Humvees and JLTVs.
"Anytime you finish up a major conflict or you are at the end of major conflict or you've just experienced a major conflict, everybody then says, 'OK, what should we do with the future force?'" Flynn said.
The Marine Corps and the Army are going through that process now, re-establishing their roles while grappling with what they have experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan.
"After eight-plus years of doing this, it's easy to default to the Marine Corps as a second land army," Flynn said. "But, we're not. We have a role in these two fights; we've performed that role as part of the joint force. What we're trying to say now is 'OK, what is the Marine Corps? What is the role of the Marine Corps in the future?'"
The answer to that question is a "sea-based force that is truly expeditionary and responsive," Flynn said.
While the services may be making different choices when it comes to survivability versus mobility, it does not necessarily signify a disagreement, Flynn said.
"I think the United States needs a heavy capability; I think the United States needs a sea-based capability," Flynn said. "This joint tool kit truly has to have multiple tools."
The services will continue to work closely together, he added.
"We don't always agree, but we do get a lot of synergy out of working together and by knowing what each other are doing," Flynn said. â–
E-mail: kbrannen@defensenews.com