Moderadores: Lepanto, poliorcetes, Edu, Orel
Atticus escribió:¿Eses consciente de la contradiccion entre esas dos frases? ¿Por que tendria que haber doctrina para deshacerse de armas e identificaciones si un francotirador no fuese otra cosa que un combatiente "normal"?
Atticus escribió:Y yo no he dicho que haya francotiradores buenos y francotiradores malos.
Atticus escribió:Y el que los americanos fueran los glorificadores del asunto por las razones citadas esta ahi. Has mencionado unos cuantos tiradores famosos....Pero....¿Sabes a cuanto se pagaba el cuarto y mitad de Simo Häyhä si lo pillaban?
Atticus escribió: Algunos estais tan absurdamente apegados a un bando que cualquier comentario os lo tomais como si alguien se metiera con vuestro club de futbol favorito.
Atticus escribió: Los francotiradores antes estaban muy mal vistos. Discutirlo es mas que absurdo. Solo en los ultimos tiempos se ha "normalizado" a esa clase de combatientes. Y eso no es ni bueno, ni malo, ni de gringos, ni de mediopensionistas. Eso es historia.
CVR escribió:Desde cuándo se les ejecuta sumarisimamente. No es delito de guerra (o estoy yo muy equivocado). Cosa distinta es la venganza del enemigo por haber hecho bajas que saben que son imputables directamente al francotirador, pero como cuando se hacen muchas bajas al tomar una posición y el que las sufre te pasa factura
poliorcetes escribió:Como al tirador de MG alemán, que por defecto le caía todo encima y que tenía una esperanza de vida lamentable. O las ejecuciones de infantes alemanes en el muro del atlántico por parte de americanos en el día D y siguiente.
O más cerca, la carretera de la muerte de Basora.
Las leyes de guerra dicen lo que dicen, y se cumplen cuando se cumplen. Al paco lo llevaría un poco peor según momentos, pero no es más que un todo continuo.
All three companies have designed new rifle and machine gun prototypes soldiers have already been testing. The Army is expected to make a decision on who will supply the force with new weapons and start fielding them next year.
While the service does not have a clear timeline on when the weapon replacement will be complete, many soldiers might be training with the old weapons for a long time, partly because the new ammo could be in short supply for a while.
It could take "three to four years" for the Lake City Ammunition Plant, the military's largest producer of small-caliber ammunition, to fully transition to making 6.8mm rounds on a large scale, Doug Bush, who serves as acting assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology, told lawmakers. The facility is in Independence, Missouri.
While the Army is looking into new guns and slowly moving to field 6.8mm ammunition, the force could see a dip in the number of bullets it buys next year. The force's 2022 budget calls for a reduction of more than half a billion dollars in ammo spending. The administration's proposed budget outlines $2.1 billion for ammo versus $2.8 billion this year.
The service is taking a hit in the new budget proposal, which still has to be approved by Congress. The administration is asking for $173 billion for the Army, a drop from this year's $176.6 billion.
Murray said the Pentagon looked at places to make cuts, and ammunition was where the Army took a big hit. He noted that the force has a stockpile but didn't specify how big or whether training drawdowns during the pandemic saved the force a lot of ammo.
20210607 TAL Hearing: "Fiscal Year 2022 Army and Marine Corps Ground Systems Modernization Programs"
At 3:00pm ET on June 7, 2021, the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces will meet in open session to receive testimony on the fiscal year (FY) 2022 bu...
00:14:10 we are grateful to you and your colleagues on the committee for reform initiatives that have been instrumental to our efforts to streamline and gain efficiencies in the acquisition process and accelerate the delivery of capability to soldiers this includes our use of middle tier acquisition authority for rapid prototyping to accelerate select efforts linked to our modernization priorities including the extended range canon artillery integrated visual augmentation system and next generation squad weapon among others
00:31:50 i'd like to start with you i'm i'm deeply concerned about the budget request for the procurement of army ammunition and specifically the small and medium caliber request account the fy 22 president's budget request reflects severe reductions in the budget request the 556 millimeter the 762 millimeter and the 50 caliber ammunition the reductions from the fy 21 enacted net levels equate to reductions of 26 28 and 49 respectively for an overall reduction of approximately 30 percent in the small arms ammunition account this is concerning to me because last year's fy 22 fighter reflected an increase for each of these accounts and so we're not only not increasing them but we have severe reductions i'm concerned that these severe reductions will affect the overall readiness of our ground forces and severely handicap their ability to train and to fight additionally the severity of these reductions will have an impact on the ability to just sustain a workforce at the lake city ammunition plant the location of where the army plans to build the 6.8 millimeter ammunition for the next generation squad weapon with these proposed cuts the army is risking losing an experienced workforce which could take nine months to years to restore and the projection from the current contractor is that 500 to 700 employees would lose their jobs and many of these employees are not only constituents of mine but they have worked there for years and have this training and this capability that just can't be easily replaced or the spigot turned back on in nine months so mr bush why is the army requesting such a large reduction from what was previously planned for small army arms ammunition and what solutions are being considered within the pentagon to mitigate the risk to the health and resilience of america's critical defense industrial uh support base spam thank you for the question um so i would start with and i'll let general murray add on the requirements side here the army every year makes adjustments to its ammunition production in order to achieve stocks required for both training and uh overseas contingencies and war plans so year-to-year fluctuations do occur those reductions do that you noted do reflect a movement of funds away from those things to protect other things in the budget so they are part of that judgment call that was made i'm not familiar i apologize with the specific potential workforce effects you're citing i am happy to meet with you and your staff to discuss those to learn more about i had not heard any numbers along those lines ma'am but i'd be happy to learn more and work with you on what how those are calculated or what the possible options might be to mitigate um if you wouldn't mind i'd like general murray to answer the requirements part that's okay yes yes ma'am thank you mr bush ma'am the uh that's part of the what the chairman mentioned earlier in terms of the decrease in rda and procurement accounts so 4.2 billion dollars as we looked at that decrease across the board where can we accept risk what we consider to be acceptable risk in order to account for that decrease in the rda and procurement and the procurement accounts for the rda accounts and so when we worked with the operational community here inside the pentagon and then with forces command who does the training as we looked across the board we thought that was an acceptable level of risk given the stocks we currently have on hand and what's projected in terms of requirements for those calipers of ammunition
00:35:47 i'd like to start with you i'm i'm deeply concerned about the budget request for the procurement of army ammunition and specifically the small and medium caliber request account the fy 22 president's budget request reflects severe reductions in the budget request the 556 millimeter the 762 millimeter and the 50 caliber ammunition the reductions from the fy 21 enacted net levels equate to reductions of 26 28 and 49 respectively for an overall reduction of approximately 30 percent in the small arms ammunition account this is concerning to me because last year's fy 22 fighter reflected an increase for each of these accounts and so we're not only not increasing them but we have severe reductions i'm concerned that these severe reductions will affect the overall readiness of our ground forces and severely handicap their ability to train and to fight additionally the severity of these reductions will have an impact on the ability to just sustain a workforce at the lake city ammunition plant the location of where the army plans to build the 6.8 millimeter ammunition for the next generation squad weapon with these proposed cuts the army is risking losing an experienced workforce which could take nine months to years to restore and the projection from the current contractor is that 500 to 700 employees would lose their jobs and many of these employees are not only constituents of mine but they have worked there for years and have this training and this capability that just can't be easily replaced or the spigot turned back on in nine months so mr bush why is the army requesting such a large reduction from what was previously planned for small army arms ammunition and what solutions are being considered within the pentagon to mitigate the risk to the health and resilience of america's critical defense industrial uh support base spam thank you for the question um so i would start with and i'll let general murray add on the requirements side here the army every year makes adjustments to its ammunition production in order to achieve stocks required for both training and uh overseas contingencies and war plans so year-to-year fluctuations do occur those reductions do that you noted do reflect a movement of funds away from those things to protect other things in the budget so they are part of that judgment call that was made i'm not familiar i apologize with the specific potential workforce effects you're citing i am happy to meet with you and your staff to discuss those to learn more about i had not heard any numbers along those lines ma'am but i'd be happy to learn more and work with you on what how those are calculated or what the possible options might be to mitigate um if you wouldn't mind i'd like general murray to answer the requirements part that's okay yes yes ma'am thank you mr bush ma'am the uh that's part of the what the chairman mentioned earlier in terms of the decrease in rda and procurement accounts so 4.2 billion dollars as we looked at that decrease across the board where can we accept risk what we consider to be acceptable risk in order to account for that decrease in the rda and procurement and the procurement accounts for the rda accounts and so when we worked with the operational community here inside the pentagon and then with forces command who does the training as we looked across the board we thought that was an acceptable level of risk given the stocks we currently have on hand and what's projected in terms of requirements for those calipers of ammunition
okay so let's let's talk about the next squad weapon so the subcommittee understands the next generation squad weapon is evaluating three candidate rifles and three candidates 6.8 millimeter bullet technologies to replace the m4 carbine and it's 556 millimeter round in close contact so to give us a status of the next generation squad weapon program and under what circumstances and when will the army consider retirement of all 556 millimeter rifles and carbines and provides soldiers the 6.8 millimeter rifles ma'am i can take the first part of that on the programmatics i'll let general murray talk about requirements um so as you know uh this is a program that's using new authorities from congress uh we are in the middle of rapid prototyping right now with the as you mentioned more than one vendor we are looking to make a rapid fielding decision early in the first quarter of fy 22 down to one at which point we would proceed into rapid fielding in initial production um that includes selecting uh the ammunition to go along with the weapon so ma'am as you know right now that requirement is not for the entire army so i'll let general murray talk about the future of 556 yes ma'am and it is actually as you know two different weapons so a rifle and an automatic rifle with a common cartridge and so and as you mentioned ma'am the it's right now we're programming for the close combat force plus some additionals in terms of special operations command the number is somewhere around 120 000 we're talking about right now with a combination of the two and then we have not considered yet whether we will replace the m4 and the m16 the f4 carbine the m16 which fires the 5.56 millimeter ammunition we spoke of that's that is a future decision to be made very much dependent upon what we find with the prototyping effort we have going on right now
00:37:54 okay very good and mr bush please describe the plan and timeline to establish the 6.8 millimeter ammunition manufacturing at lake city army ammunition plant to support the feeling of and training with the new rifle as well as necessary forces yes ma'am so could you please describe yeah the the plan and the timeline the 6.8 ammunition plan there at lake city yes ma'am so uh fy 22 request includes the funding for preliminary work necessary to support whatever ammunition type is selected or production at lake city in the future so that's my understanding is that all that preliminary work is properly funded and fully funded in fy22 what would follow is a transition over a number of years from initially contractor produced ammunition to capability at lake city to produce everything the army needs for that new type of ammunition they would take place over i believe it's three to four years before it's completely transitioned because of the requirements for a new facility okay very good and and before we change subjects i do uh appreciate your offer to meet with me my staff about this issue and how to mitigate it um and to learn more because obviously this is real concerning to us here in missouri
Tras una reciente decisión del Bundeskartellamt en Bonn, la concesión del sistema de fusil de asalto Bundeswehr a Heckler &Koch está un paso más cerca. "Hoy, el 10 de junio de 2021, la Cámara Federal de Adquisiciones rechazó la solicitud de revisión de la empresa C. G. Haenel GmbH contra el Gobierno Federal en el procedimiento relativo a la adjudicación de la "Producción y suministro de rifles de asalto con accesorios para el Bundeswehr" (sistema de proyecto de fusil de asalto)", dijo el Ministerio Federal de Defensa (BMVg) en un comunicado de prensa publicado.
"No pudimos identificar ningún error en la adjudicación del contrato para la adquisición de nuevos fusiles de asalto para la Bundeswehr. En nuestra opinión, la decisión de no adjudicar el contrato a Haenel sino a su competidor Heckler & Koch fue correcta", dijo Andreas Mundt, presidente del Bundeskartellamt, en un comunicado de prensa de la Oficina del Cártel.
"Al hacerlo, la Cámara de Adquisiciones ha declarado expresamente que el Ministerio Federal de Defensa tiene la intención de adjudicar el contrato en este procedimiento de adjudicación a Heckler & Koch GmbH", continuó el BmVg.
Después de que Haenel emergiera originalmente como el ganador de una competencia de comparación con el MK556, la Bundeswehr ha rescindido su decisión de adjudicación en otoño de 2020. El trasfondo de la decisión fueron las infracciones de patentes por parte de Haenel, según el BMVg en un comunicado en ese momento. Como resultado, la Bundeswehr tomó la decisión a principios de marzo de 2021 de presentar el HK416 A8, que supuestamente surgió de la competencia de comparación como el rifle más potente, pero también más caro, como el sucesor del G36.
Ahora resulta oficialmente que no fueron las infracciones de patentes las que causaron la anulación de la decisión de adjudicación, sino una oferta más económica por parte de Heckler &Ampch. El Bundeskartellamt señala que las posibles infracciones de patentes no fueron la razón de la exclusión de Haenel. "Sin embargo, la Cámara de Adjudicación finalmente no tuvo que decidir sobre esta exclusión debido a la infracción de patente citada, ya que Haenel ya no era elegible para la celebración de un contrato por otras razones: Un recálculo necesario del precio de oferta de Haenel había demostrado que la oferta de la compañía era económicamente inferior a la de Heckler &Koch", escribe el Bundeskartellamt en un comunicado. "En su decisión, la Cámara de Adquisiciones también se ocupó de los motivos de exclusión, que Haenel hizo valer contra Heckler &Koch. La decisión discrecional de la BAAINBw de no excluir a Heckler &Koch del laudo no fue objetable en el resultado", continuó la Oficina del Cártel.
Al mismo tiempo, el Ministerio señala que la decisión aún no es definitiva, ya que Haenel todavía tiene abiertos otros pasos legales, el curso ante el Tribunal Regional Superior de Düsseldorf. El plazo para presentar un recurso ante el Tribunal Regional Superior de Düsseldorf es de dos semanas.
Por lo tanto, se considera poco probable que una decisión de adquisición del nuevo fusil de asalto pueda realizarse en este período legislativo, ya que C.G. Haenel anunció hace algún tiempo que quería agotar sus posibilidades legales.
La licitación a escala europea para el sucesor del G36 comenzó el 21 de abril de 2017, y la Bundeswehr quiere adquirir alrededor de 120.000 rifles de asalto y accesorios correspondientes.
Actualización – Declaración C.G. Haenel
Mientras tanto, la empresa con sede en Suhl también ha comentado la decisión de la cámara de adquisiciones. "La decisión de la cámara de adjudicación es extremadamente decepcionante y objetivamente incomprensible. Seguimos convencidos de que hemos hecho la mejor y más económica oferta. Excluir a C.G. Haenel con la acusación de infracción de patentes y luego retirar la orden finalmente por falta de eficiencia económica, no se nos abre. Revisaremos a fondo la justificación y nos reservaremos expresamente el derecho de emprender acciones legales", dijo C.G. Haenel en un comunicado publicado por la tarde.
poliorcetes escribió:En el indiferente. Fue un stop gap para acelerar la producción después de años perdidos en la thompson M1 y su tremendo coste (por más que fuera soberbia). Tiene un aspecto muy bueno, que es la cadencia, y en general la ejecución es razonable para lo buscado (arma fiable de cierre abierto y tan barata como fuera posible). No llegó tan a tiempo como la Sten, ni fue tan precursora como la maravillosa carabina M1.stop ga
poliorcetes escribió:De hecho, una carabina M2 mejor ejecutada (un freno de boca, por Dios!!) habría hecho un papel mucho mejor que la grease gun, porque habría cubierto su rol decentemente y habría ofrecido un alcance muy superior, casi equivalente al del StG44. Sólo con que hubiera empleado puntas spitzer, y un poco más de propelente en una vaina abotellada...
poliorcetes escribió:Algunas notas:
1. El cartucho M1 carbine da más de 1300J en boca. Eso puede triplicar la energía de un .45 y está comparativamente mucho más cerca que la energía de un SCHV como el nuestro actual, el SS109. Para ciertas mentalidades ya obsoletas en la época, calibre era más importante que energía para el arma personal y veían al .30 carbine como un cartucho anémico, lo que era absurdo. De hecho, el mito de las chaquetas chinas fue algo que agarró tracción como ocurre con el relato oral, porque sí. No hay nada imposible y menos en balística, pero una prenda de ropa cualquiera, por lo general, no va a parar munición de pistola, menos aún algo 3 veces más energético. Una visión bastante extendida es que el infante americano tenía un entrenamiento mediocre en Corea, se veía ante olas de chinos, comenzaba a tirar, fallaba… y la culpa era de las chaquetas. Eso sí, hay que señalar que el problema del cartucho fue su ejecución. Sólo con una bala spitzer un poco más alargada habrían logrado casi un equivalente del 8mm corto alemán. Eso, y como digo, la estúpida ausencia de una bocacha apagallamas con un compensador decente, que no hay forma de justificar que no se empleara en la época
poliorcetes escribió:2. Lo de la M3 es marginalmente cierto por su tamaño, pero tenía un papel muy marginal. Pasaba un poco en todos los cuerpos acorazados de la guerra fría. Fuera de un carro, donde el tamaño no es tan problemático, la M3 era carne de lo peor de la guardia nacional.
poliorcetes escribió:3. Ojo con la carabina M3 (misma denominación que el subfusil M3). La M3 era una M2 adaptada para llevar las primeras ópticas nocturnas, ya de salida mejores que la vampyr nazi… y responsables de más de un 25% de las bajas por arma corta en Okinawa pese a disponer de menos de 500 ejemplares. Pues, para que veas la demencial preparación americana en Corea, no las llevaron hasta más de la mitad del conflicto, recibiendo de continuo ataques nocturnos.
poliorcetes escribió:4. La cadencia es algo interesante. Por debajo de 600 interfiere cada vez menos con los armónicos compuestos de la articulación del brazo. Dicho de forma breve e inexacta, “no entra en resonancia” con las articulaciones y el retroceso afecta menos. Lo curioso es que por encima de 1200 DPM ocurre lo mismo, y que el la frecuencia peor para eso son 900 DPM
The FY22 Army budget includes $97 million for the NGSW program. This outlay breaks out into 390 Next Generation Squad Weapon-Automatic Rifles, intended to begin replacing the M249 SAW, at a cost of $3.6 million; 3,725 Next Generation Squad Weapon-Rifles, to start phasing out the M4/M4A1 Carbine, at a cost of $20.8 million; and 8,093 NGSW Fire Control integrated optics units, for $72.5 million, illustrating the common trope that the glass costs more than the rifle.
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